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ABSTRACT 
In the last decades, the law and practice of international arbitration worldwide has increasingly 
evolved towards greater uniformity. There remain though a few trouble spots for which 
harmonization appears more difficult to achieve. The role of the arbitrator as settlement 
facilitator appears to be one of these trouble spots. At the same time, the search for increased 
efficiency is one of the main concerns of contemporary justice, including arbitration. Hence, the 
topic of this article which examines the present state of the law and practice to determine whether 
a uniform standard may be emerging and what its content may be. 
On the basis of comparative research and field observation, the author notes that the cultural 
and legal background of an arbitrator may well influence the latter's tendency to actively 
contribute to the amicable settlement of the dispute or not. 
The author then reviews the pros and cons of an arbitrator becoming involved in settlement 
facilitation. The main advantage is the increased efficiency of the dispute settlement process, while 
the main drawback lies in the threat to the impartiality of the arbitrator should the settlement fail. 
In the light of her analysis, the author concludes that a transnational standard may well 
emerge on this issue as it has for many other topics of arbitration law in the recent past. She then 
sketches the contours of such standard. In brief, an arbitrator acting to facilitate settlement must 
seek the parties' informed consent to the process and safeguard due process and equal treatment 
and his or her impartiality. These requirements impose certain procedures which distinguish 
settlement facilitation in arbitration from mediation, yet make it a valuable tool to increase the 
efficiency of dispute resolution. 
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THIS LECTURE is devoted to the activity of arbitrators facilitating settlement. 
It seeks to establish whether current practice in international arbitration is 
moving towards a transnational standard. First, it defines the topic and sets out 
the reasons for reviewing it. Secondly, it addresses the present state of the law and 
practice, and then, thirdly, examines the pros and cons of an arbitrator facilitating 
setdement. Fourthly and last, it seeks to understand whether we are moving 
towards a uniform practice and, if so, what such a practice may be. 
I. W H A T IS A R B I T R A T O R - F A C I L I T A T E D S E T T L E M E N T 
A N D W H Y S T U D Y IT? 
The topic of this lecture deals with the arbitrator promoting settlement within 
arbitration proceedings that are already pending. It does not deal with separate 
proceedings of mediation or conciliation and arbitration, nor does it deal with 
other mechanisms in which different individuals act as arbitrator and as mediator 
or conciliator. In other words, it is concerned with cases in which the same person 
acts as both arbitrator and settlement facilitator in one and the same proceeding.' 
The arbitrator can facilitate settlement in different ways. He or she can simply 
ask a few well-targeted questions at the right time, which may shed light on the 
weaknesses of a party's case and trigger setdement discussions between the parties. 
He or she can suggest to the parties to settle their dispute in direct negotiations. The 
arbitrator can also become more involved, and these are the situations of interest 
here. Indeed, the arbitrator can offer to provide his or her own assessment of the 
dispute, which will serve as a basis for the parties' direct negotiations, or even 
offer to assist them in their settlement discussions. He or she can do so either on 
his or her own motion or at the request of one or both parties. 
Why review the legal significance of these situations and the role of the 
arbitrator as setdement facilitator? There are three main reasons why this topic 
deserves attention. First, it goes to the efficiency of dispute resolution. We live in 
a time when many complain that justice, be it judicial or arbitral, is too slow, too 
expensive, and too cumbersome. Furthering the efficiency of dispute settlement 
can obviously contribute to improving the administration of justice. The arbitrator 
taking the role of a conciliator or settlement facilitator may be one of the ways to 
increase such efficiency. 
Secondly, this topic goes to the very core of arbitration. What is arbitration? 
What is the arbitrator's mission? Is it to resolve a dispute by a binding decision? Or 
See Hilmar Raeschke-Kessler, 'The Arbitrator as Settlement Facilitator' in (2005) 21 Arb. Int'l 323; Michael 
Schneider, 'Combining Arbitration with Conciliation' in ICCA Congress Series No. 8 (Seoul 1996), p. 57; Klaus-
Peter Berger, 'Integration of Mediation Elements into Arbitration: Hybrid Procedures and "Intuitive" 
Mediation by International Arbitrators' in (2003) 19 Arb. Int'l 387; Harold I. Abramson, 'Protocols for 
International Arbitrators who Dare to Settle Cases' in (1999) 10 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 1 at p. 3; Christian 
Buhring-Uhle, Arbitration and Mediation in International Business (1996); David W. Plant, 'Mediation in 
International Commercial Arbitration: Some Practical Aspects' in (1998) ILSA J Int'l and Comp. L (Spring) 
329; Christian Biihring-Uhle, Gabriele Scherer and Lars Kirchhoff, 'The Arbitrator as Mediator: Some 
Recent Empirical Insights' in (2003) 20( 1) J Int'l Arb. SI. 
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is it simply to resolve a dispute? In the latter case, an arbitrator could promote 
settlement. In the former, he or she could not. These are fundamental issues that 
deal with the role of the judge or arbitrator in society. 
Thirdly, this is a topic on which there appears to be no established 
transnational consensus so far. Starting with the New York Convention, followed 
by the UNGITRAL Arbitration Rules and the UNCITRAL Model Law, together 
with a series of national laws and institutional rules as well as soft law texts such 
as the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence, there has been a powerful wave of 
harmonisation of the law and practice of international arbitration in the last 
decades. The beauty of this harmonisation process is that it merges very different 
procedural cultures. This comes as no surprise. International arbitration is a 
place where arbitrators and counsel trained in different legal systems (along with 
the parties they represent) meet and work together to achieve a result — the 
resolution of a dispute. They have no choice but to find some common ground.2 
There are many examples of harmonisation in the law and practice of 
arbitration: separability of the arbitration agreement, Kompetenz-Kompetenz, limited 
remedies against the award, party autonomy, and document production, to name 
just a few. 
In this vast movement of convergence, there remain a few trouble spots. The 
role of the arbitrator as settlement facilitator in international arbitration appears 
to be one of those remaining differences. Obviously, the goal is not to do away with 
all divergences in arbitration. Indeed, the world is richer as a result of differences. 
In domestic arbitration, especially in areas where a weaker party needs protection, 
national laws show many differences.3 However, in international arbitration, where 
the activities giving rise to disputes are transnational or global in nature and 
where the participants come from different national and legal backgrounds or 
cultures, divergences are not desirable. 
II. T H E S T A T E O F T H E LAW A N D P R A C T I C E 
Before addressing the law and practice in international arbitration, it may be 
helpful to look to the state of the law in national courts. One may have doubts 
about the merits of referring to the practice of national courts when dealing 
with a topic pertaining to international arbitration and transnational notions. 
Regardless, experience and empirical research show that arbitration practitioners 
often approach the role of the arbitrator by referring to the rules applicable in 
their home courts. 
2
 See e.g., Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, 'Globalization of Arbitral Procedure' in (2003) 36 Vanderbilt J 
Transnational L 1313 (providing citations of other writings on the harmonisation of international arbitration). 
3
 For a discussion of the residual roles of national legislation at a time when, with the advent of globalisation, 
the power to regulate arbitration has shifted from states to private actors, see Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, 
'Global Implications of the U.S. Federal Arbitration Act (FAA): the Role of Legislation in International 
Arbitration' in (2005) 20 ICSID Rev. - FILJ 339. 
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(a) State of the Law in National Courts 
In the Romano-Germanic tradition, it is part of a court's mission to seek to settle 
the dispute before it.4 German courts, for instance, have a continuing duty throughout 
the proceedings to pay attention to settlement possibilities. In principle, they will 
call a pre-hearing settlement session with the parties in person (Giiteverkandlung), 
during which they ask questions and assess the merits of the case. Such a session 
can also be held at a later stage of the proceedings, including at the appellate 
stage. Moreover, the court may refer the parties to another judge for conciliation 
purposes or even to out-of-court alternative dispute resolution (ADR).5 The reason 
for this practice, which reflects a deeply rooted tradition,6 is to increase the 
efficiency of dispute resolution. Indeed, it is thought that resolution through a 
settlement is preferable to resolution through a judgment.7 The same approach 
prevails in certain parts of Switzerland8 and in Austria.9 
The French Code of Civil Procedure contains an express provision stating that 
conciliation falls within the scope of a court's attributions.10 Yet, French judges 
are reluctant to become involved in the settlement of their own cases unless the 
parties specifically agree to their involvement. Usually, judges do not attempt to 
conciliate cases they are adjudicating, but, rather, choose to refer those cases to 
other judges for settlement, apparently out of a fear that the conciliation attempt 
could somehow dilute their judicial power.'' 
Traditionally, common law courts under the adversarial system have been 
entrusted with adjudicating, not settling, disputes.12 As Judith Resnik eloquently 
4
 See Martin Shapiro, Courts: a Comparative and Political Analysis (1981), pp. 2, 8-9, 126-127. See also, Thomas 
Clay, L'arbitre (2001), para. 207 et seq. 
5
 See German Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO), s. 278. On this provision, see Adolph Baumbach, 
Zivilprozessordnung (2007), s. 278; Hans-Joachim Musielak, Kommentar zur Zjvilprozessordnung (2007), s. 278. 
6
 In particular, it can be traced back to s. 110 of the Jiinger Reichsabschied of 1654 (available at 
www.rzuser.uni.heidelberg.de/~cd2/drw/t7JRALaufs.htm), which was the source of the Prussian General 
Code of Jurisdiction of 1793. That text stated that the judge was to act as conciliator to avoid 'losses of time 
and money' and 'the animosities and asperities that can easily occur'. It continued to state that the judge had 
to settle 'in all earnest' and at any moment of the proceedings. This provision was in essence integrated in s. 
279 of the 1877 German Code of Civil Procedure. 
7
 In particular, see Baumbach, supra n. 5 at s. 278 n. 6. 
8
 See e.g., ZPO Zurich, arts. 62 and 118(1); Richard Frank, Hans Strauli and Georg Messmer, Kommentar zur 
Ziirchmschen Zjvilprozessordnung (1997), p. 424; see also, Swiss Civil Procedure Bill, art. 122(3); on this practice, 
see Peter Nobel, 'Vergleich und Urteil—Konkurrenz zweier Erledigungsformen' in Peter Gauch, Franz Werro 
and Pascal Pichonnaz, Melanges en I'honneur de Pierre Tercier (2008), and Werner Wenger, 'The Role of the 
Arbitrator in Bringing about a Setdement' in Best Practices in International Arbitration (ASA Special Series, 
2006), p. 139. 
9
 See Austrian Code of Civil Procedure (ZPO), s. 204(1). 
0
 See French Code of Civil Procedure (NCPC), art. 21, which is applicable to arbitration pursuant to NCPC, 
art. 1460. 
1
 See Francois Ruellan, 'Les modes alternatifs de resolution des conflits: pour une justice plurielle dans le 
respect du droit' in (1999) JCPG, etude no. 19-135 ; Bruno Oppetit, 'L'arbitrage, mediation et conciliation' 
in (1984) Rev. Arb. 308; Yvon Desdevises, 'Remarques sur la place de la conciliation dans les textes recents de 
procedure civile' in (1981) Recueil Dalloz, Chron. 32, 241. 
2
 See generally, John E. Coons, Approaches to Court Imposed Compromises: the Uses of Doubt and Reason' in 
(1964) 58 .Afe ULRev. 750. 
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explained 25 years ago, until recently, the US legal establishment embraced a 
classical view of the judicial role. Under this view, judges are not supposed to have 
an involvement or interest in the controversies they adjudicate. Disengagement 
and dispassion supposedly enable judges to decide cases fairly and impartially.13 
Along this same line of reasoning, rule 16 of the original 1938 Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, which dealt with pre-trial procedures, made no mention of 
settlement,14 thus reflecting the notion that the drafters intended to limit the 
judge's pre-trial role to trial preparation.15 This situation started to change in the 
early 1980s when Resnik and others helped launch a debate in the United States 
about 'judicial management' and 'managerial judges' that stemmed primarily 
from frustrations over the costs, delays and formalism of adjudication.16 In 1983, 
a new provision of rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allowed courts 
a measure of discretion concerning settlement: 
In any action, the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties and any 
unrepresented parties to appear before it for a conference or conferences before trial for such 
purposes as ... facilitating the settlement of the case.17 
Rule 16 went on to provide that 'the participants at any conference under this 
rule may consider and take action with respect to ... the possibility of settlement 
or the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the dispute'.18 As courts were 
participants in these pre-trial conferences, this rule allowed them to take action to 
promote settiement. The 1993 amendment to Rule 16 reinforced the courts' 
authority to take an active role in encouraging settlement: 
At any conference under this rule consideration may be given, and the court may take appropriate 
action, with respect to ... settlement and the use of special procedures to assist in resolving die 
dispute when authorized by statute or local rule.19 
There are no express rules or limits set concerning what constitutes 'appropriate 
action', apart from the broad objectives provided at the beginning of rule 16, 
including the discouragement of 'wasteful pretrial activities'.20 Therefore, it 
essentially lies within a judge's discretion to determine the appropriate measures 
for facilitating the resolution of the dispute before the court. 
13
 Judith Resnik, 'Managerial Judges' in (1982) 96 Ham L Rev. 376. 
14
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 (1938). 
15
 See e.g., David L. Shapiro, 'Federal Rule 16: a Look at the Theory and Practice of Rulemaking' in (1989) 137 
UPa.LRev. 1969 at pp. 1980-1981. 
16
 See e.g., Resnik, supra n. 13; Arthur R. Miller, The August 1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: 
Promoting Effective Case Management and Lamyer Responsibility (1984), p. 20; Marc Galanter, 'A Settlement Judge, 
not a Trial Judge': Judicial Mediation in the United States' in (1985) 12 J L and Soc'y 1. 
17
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(5) (1983) (emphasis added). 
18
 Fed. R. Civ. P 16(c)(7) (1983). 
19
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(9) (1993) (emphasis added). 
20
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(3) (1993). 
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Many US courts have made it common practice to have special judges handle 
settlements.21 The main reason for referring a case to another judge for setdement 
is to avoid the parties feeling coerced into settling because the settlement initiative 
comes from the very person who may later adjudicate the dispute.22 The US 
Model Code of Judicial Conduct specifically states that the courts should facilitate 
setdement, but that parties 'should not feel coerced into surrendering their right 
to have the controversy resolved by the courts'.23 Admittedly, there is a fine line 
between a judge coercing setdement and a judge facilitating setdement. Nonemeless, 
the facts show that certain judges do settle their own cases and do not hesitate to 
caucus or meet separately with die parties.24 Moreover, courts have seen involvement 
in setdement negotiations as being appropriate for a judge on numerous occasions.25 
In the United Kingdom, the development in favour of ADR came in 1996 
with the reforms proposed in the Woolf Report, which essentially proposed that 
the courts 'encourag[e] and assist ... the parties to settle cases or, at least, to agree 
on particular issues' and 'encouragfe] the use of ADR'.26 This proposal was 
codified in rule 1.4 of the Civil Procedure Rules: 
(1) The court must further the overriding objective by actively managing 
cases. 
(2) Active case management includes—... 
(e) encouraging the parties to use an alternative dispute resolution 
procedure if the court considers that appropriate and facilitating the 
use of such procedure; 
(f) helping the parties to settle the whole or part of the case.27 
Therefore, the U K approach of allowing courts to get actively involved with 
settlement in the name of case management is not unlike that adopted in the 
United States under rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
21
 See Peter Lanka, 'The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Magistrate Judge's Office: 
a Glimmering Light Amidst the Haze of Federal Litigation' in (2005) 36 UWLA L Rev. 71 at p. 88; 
R. Lawrence Dessem, 'The Civil Justice Reform Act: the Role of the Federal Magistrate Judge in Civil 
Justice Reform' in (1993) 67 St. John's L Rev. 799 at pp. 818-821. 
22
 See Edward Brunet, Judicial Mediation and Signaling' in (2003) 3 Nev. LJ 232 at p. 248. 
23
 Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3B(8) cmt (2003). 
24
 See generally, Daisy Hurst Floyd, 'Can the Judge Do That? The Need for a Clearer Judicial Role in 
Settlement' in (1995) 26 Ariz- St. LJ 45 at pp. 53-56; Galanter, supra n. 16 at p. 7; Harold Baer, Jr., 'History, 
Process, and a Role forjudges in Mediating their Own Cases' in (2001) 58 MTU Ann. Surv. Am. L 131; Sylvia 
Shaz Shweder, Judicial Limitations in ADR: the Role and Ethics of Judges Encouraging Settlements' in 
(2007) 20 Geo. J Legal Ethics 51. 
25
 Seee.g, Wileyv. United Parcel Service, Inc., 11 Fed. Appx. 181, 182 (4th Cir. 2001); In re Martinez-Catala, 129 F.3d 
213, 216-18 (1st Cir. 1997); Johnson v. Shaker Heights City School District, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17963 (N.D 
Ohio 2007) at *5-10; Bell v. Johnson, 404 F.3d 997, 1005 (6th Cir. 2005). See also, Hurst Floyd, supra n. 24 at 
pp. 70-72 (discussing several cases where the trial judge's active involvement in settlement negotiations was 
deemed acceptable). 
26
 See generally, Lord Woolf MR, Access to Justice, Final Report (1996), ch. 1, para. 7(d) and ch. 1, para. 16(b)-(c), 
available at www.dca.gov.uk/civil/final/index.htm. See also, Henry J. Brown and Arthur L. Marriott, ADR 
Principles and Practice (2nd edn, 1999), pp. 28-29. 
27
 Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (CPR), Rule 1.4(1)—(2), available at www.justice.gov.uk/civil/procrules_fin/ 
contents/parts/partO 1 .htm#rule 1_4 
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To summarise, with regard to judicial involvement in settiement, there is a 
strong movement in favour of settlement and away from adjudication for reasons 
of efficiency. 
(b) Arbitration Law 
Most national arbitration statutes are silent on the acceptability of an arbitrator 
becoming involved in settlement. This is true of the UNCITRAL Model Law, 
which has been adopted in, or has influenced to varying extents, the laws of a 
large number of countries. There are exceptions, however.28 For instance, the 
Hong Kong and Singapore Arbitration Acts provide that the arbitrator may act 
as conciliator.29 These provisions are undoubtedly the result of the influence of 
the Chinese tradition, which will be discussed in further detail below. 
Institutional arbitration rules are also generally silent on the acceptability of 
an arbitrator becoming involved in settlement. Here again, there are a few 
exceptions, for instance, in Germany30 and, predominantly, in Asia.31 In the area 
of investment arbitration, the ICSID Arbitration Rules provide that the tribunal 
may hold a conference at the request of the parties 'to consider the issues in 
dispute with a view to reaching an amicable settlement'.32 
The Code of Arbitration for Sports also is worth mentioning. Under the Code, 
the arbitral tribunal may conciliate in commercial disputes, but not in appeals 
from sanctions of sports governing bodies for disciplinary or doping offences.33 
28
 There is in particular an exception in s. 27 of the Western Australia Commercial Arbitration Act 1985, 
which provides: '(1) Parties to an arbitration agreement ... (a) may seek settlement of a dispute between them by 
mediation, conciliation or similar means; or (b) may authorize an arbitrator or umpire to act as a mediator, conciliator or other 
non-arbitral intermediary between them (whether or not involving a conference to be conducted by the arbitrator or umpire), 
whether before or after proceeding to arbitration, and whether or not continuing with the arbitration. (2) Where ... (a) an 
arbitrator or umpire acts as a mediator, conciliator or intermediary (with or without a conference) under 
subsection (1); and (b) that action fails to produce a settlement of the dispute acceptable to the parties to the dispute, no 
objection shall be taken to the conduct by the arbitrator or umpire of the subsequent arbitration proceedings solely on the ground 
that the arbitrator or umpire had previously taken that action in relation to the dispute. (3) Unless the parties otherwise 
agree in writing, an arbitrator or umpire is bound by the rules of natural justice when seeking a settlement 
under subsection (1)' (emphasis added). Western Australia Commercial Arbitration Act 1985, s. 27 (Austl.), 
available at www.austlii .edu.au/au/legis/wa/consol_act/caal985219/s27.html 
29
 Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance (2000), s. 2B(1), provides that '[i]f all parties to a reference consent in 
writing, and for so long as no party withdraws in writing his consent, an arbitrator or umpire may act as a 
conciliator'. International Arbitration Act of Singapore (2002), art. 1 (1) adopts the same wording. 
30
 DIS Rules, art. 32(1) (At every stage of the proceedings, the arbitral tribunal should seek to encourage an 
amicable settlement of the dispute or of individual issues in dispute'). 
31
 For instance, CIETAC Arbitration Rules 2005, art. 40, provides that, 'where both parties have the desire for 
conciliation or one party so desires and the other party agrees when approached by the arbitral tribunal, the 
arbitral tribunal may conciliate the case during the course of the arbitration proceedings', and further, 
'where conciliation fails, the arbitral tribunal shall proceed with the arbitration and render an arbitral 
award'. Beijing Arbitration Commission Arbitration Rules 2004 ('BAC Rules 2004'), art. 38, also provides 
that 'the arbitral tribunal may, at the request of both parties or upon obtaining the consent of both parties, 
conciliate the case in a manner it considers appropriate'. Under the special provisions for international 
commercial arbitration, BAC Rules 2004, art. 56, provides similarly. 
32
 ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration Rules), rule 21(2). 
33
 The Code provides for the possibility of conciliation in the context of the ordinary arbitration procedure (art. 42), 
but not of the appeals procedure. 
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Such offences are not eligible for separate mediation either.34 The reason for 
excluding this category of disputes from negotiated settlement lies in the interests 
at stake. A doping sanction is comparable to a criminal sanction. It affects the 
rights of other competitors,35 as well as the interests of the sports community and 
the public in general. It also raises issues concerning the fairness of the 
competition and public health. A setdement between a sports federation and an 
athlete about a ban for a doping offence would breach equal treatment between 
athletes, which is a fundamental principle of sports law.36 A 'plea bargaining logic' 
(to use the terms of the Swiss Supreme Court)37 would prevent the application of 
the law,38 and would lead to an intolerable breach of equal treatment in view of 
the strong public interest component involved.39 Regardless of the reason for 
excluding this category, this shows that there may be entire categories of disputes 
that do not lend themselves to setdement. This is an aspect that one needs to bear 
in mind when it comes to proposing a transnational rule on the role of the 
arbitrator as setdement facilitator. 
A recent development also deserves attention in this context. The Guidelines 
on Conflicts of Interest of the International Bar Association (IBA) provide that an 
arbitrator's impartiality is not affected by his or her involvement in settlement, 
but that if settlement fails and the arbitration continues, the arbitrator should 
resign if he or she considers that he or she cannot perform his or her duties 
34
 CAS Mediation Rules, art. 1; see Ousmane Kane, 'The CAS Mediation Rules' in Ian Biackshaw, Robert 
Siekman andjanwillem Soek (eds.), The Court of Arbitration for Sport 1984-2004 (2006), p. 195, stating that the 
Code submits such disputes to the appeal arbitration procedure, 'given the need to have a position of 
principle rather than a negotiated solution for these issues'. In the same sense, see Christopher Newmark, 'Is 
Mediation Effective for Resolving Sports Disputes?' in Ian Biackshaw (ed.), Mediating Sports Disputes, Motional 
and International Perspectives (2002), pp. 78, 82 in fine. 
35
 See Newmark, supra n. 34. 
36
 See Antonio Rigozzi, L'arbitrage international en matiere de sport (2005), no. 491. 
37
 See the so-called 'Chinese Swimmers case', Swiss Federal Supreme Court, Judgment of 31 March 1999, 
5P.83/1999, published in Digest of CAS Awards II, 1998-2000, p. 767 at. p. 771. 
38
 See Rigozzi, supra n. 36, citing Bruno Oppetit, Theorie de I'arbitrage (1998), p. 36: 'en ce qu'elle tend d'avantage 
a un reglement en opportunite qu'en droit strict et en ce qu'elle cherche plus a dissoudre le litige qu'a le 
resoudre, la mediation ne contribue pas a valoriser la regie de droit'. Or in this author's free translation: 
'Because it aims more at a settlement taking into account the interests involved rather than the legal 
positions and seeks to dissolve rather than resolve a dispute, mediation does not further the rule of law'. 
39
 For the sake of completeness, one should mention that in certain jurisdictions, in particular France and Italy, 
disciplinary disputes other than doping cases are subject to (mandatory or optional) conciliation. See art. 19 of 
French Law no. 84-610 of 16July 1984 on Sports (as amended) and art. 4 of the Regulations of the Chamber 
for Conciliation and Arbitration of Sports Disputes of the Italian National Olympic Committee; see also, 
descriptions in Rigozzi, supra n. 36 at no. 49; Bernard Foucher, 'Conciliation as a Way of Resolving Sports 
Related Disputes in France' in Biackshaw, supra n. 34 at p. 67; Jean-Christophe Lapouble, 'Sport, la nouvelle loi 
sur le sport numero 2000-627 du 6 juillet 2000' in (2001) JCP G Semaine Juridique (edition generate), 6 July, no. 23, 
pp. 1093-1099; Jean-Pierre Karaquillo, 'Le prealable obligatoire de conciliation devant le Comite national 
olympique et sportif francais' in Arbitration of Sports Related Disputes (ASA Special Series No. 11, 1998), p. 59. One 
should also mention that, in practice, if one disregards the concerns about public interest and equal treatment, 
no rule prevents a settlement between an athlete and his or her governing body over a disciplinary sanction 
even in a doping case. See the examples provided by Rigozzi, supra n. 36, citing the 'Chinese Swimmers 
case', supra n. 37. See also, the setdement in the doping dispute between the skater Kyoko Ina and USADA: 
available at www.usantidoping.org/files/active/resources/press_releases/PressRelease_10_25_2002.pdf; 
www.usantidoping.org/files/active/resources/press_releases/PressRelease_ 1_16_2003 [ 1 ] ,pdf. 
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objectively as a result of his or her involvement in the settlement attempts.40 This 
development is interesting because the Guidelines were drafted on the basis of 
reports on national laws by a working group of practitioners in which all legal 
traditions were represented. It can thus be viewed as a synthesis of the different 
legal traditions involved. 
Similarly, the IBA Rules of Ethics for International Arbitrators accept the idea 
of a tribunal 'making proposals for settlement', provided that the parties agree 
and the proposals are made 'to both parties simultaneously, and preferably in the 
presence of each other'.41 Finally, another recent development deserves mention. 
The Centre for Effective Dispute Resolution (CEDR) has set up a Commission, 
co-chaired by Lord Woolf of Barnes and this author, to draft best practice 
guidelines on arbitrators' facilitating settlement.42 These guidelines which, among 
other sources, are inspired by a first version of this article, are in the course of 
finalisation at the time of writing. 
(c) Arbitration Practice 
In practice, what do arbitrators do, or not do, when it comes to settlement? 
Whether they become involved or not in the cases before them obviously depends 
on the dispute, on the wishes of the parties, and also on their own legal 
background or culture. Two illustrations demonstrate this last point. 
The author recently carried out a review of over 60 consent awards issued 
under the ICC Rules between 2003 and 2006.43 On the face of the awards 
reviewed, it was clear that the arbitrators had actively contributed to bringing 
about a settlement in 13 cases. Out of these 13 cases, six were presided over by 
a German or Swiss arbitrator. In addition, these cases involved seven party-
appointed arbitrators of these two nationalities.44 Furthermore, they comprised 
40
 See IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration (2004), s. 4(d): 'An arbitrator may 
assist the parties in reaching a settlement of the dispute at any stage of the proceedings. However, before 
doing so, the arbitrator should receive an express agreement by the parties that acting in such a manner shall 
not disqualify the arbitrator from continuing to serve as arbitrator. Such express agreement shall be 
considered to be an effective waiver of any potential conflict of interest that may arise from the arbitrator's 
participation in such process or from information that the arbitrator may learn in the process. If the 
assistance by the arbitrator does not lead to final settlement of the case, the parties remain bound by their 
waiver. However, consistent with General Standard 2(a) and notwithstanding such agreement, the arbitrator 
shall resign if, as a consequence of his or her involvement in the settlement process, the arbitrator develops 
doubts as to his or her ability to remain impartial or independent in the future course of the arbitration 
proceedings'. 
41
 See IBA Rules of Ethics for International Arbitrators (1987), s. 8. 
42
 CEDR Commission on Settlement in International Arbitration. See wwwcedr.com/index.php?location=/ 
news/archive/20070710_277.htm 
43
 Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler and Victor Bonnin, 'The Arbitrator as Conciliator: a Statistical Approach of 
the Relation between an Arbitrator's Role and his/her Legal Culture' in (2007) 18(2) ICC Bull. 81. 
44
 One may object that Swiss nationality is, in any event, the one most represented in ICC tribunals ((2003) 
14(1) ICC Bull. 12; (2004) 15(1) ICC Bull. 11; (2005) 16(1) ICC Bull. 9; (2006) 17(1) ICC Bull. 9; (2007) 18(1) 
ICC Bull. 10), and therefore no inference can be drawn on the role of an arbitrator's legal culture from these 
figures. This may be true for Swiss arbitrators. It is not for German arbitrators, who ranked only fifth among 
the most frequently appointed arbitrators, while English and French arbitrators are more often appointed 
and do not appear to be predominant among the tribunals contributing to the settlement of disputes. 
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tribunals composed of Latin-American nationals exclusively. Although the sampling 
is limited,45 it is interesting to note that all of these arbitrators were from legal 
backgrounds where courts facilitate settlement.46 
Another example of the influence of the legal culture of arbitrators in 
determining whether they participate in settlement is the practice of Chinese 
tribunals. At different points in time, Chinese philosophy has relied on two 
competing schools of thought that relate to social organisation and thereby to 
dispute settlement: Confucianism and legalism.47 Legalists consider that social 
harmony can only be achieved by strict state control, which translates into 
top-down adjudicative resolution of disputes. Legalism was dominant until the 
third century BC, when Confucianism was imposed.48 Confucianists consider 
that social harmony can only be achieved by the avoidance of disputes,49 with the 
result that settlement becomes the only respectable way of resolving differences.50 
Consequently, the role of courts shifted towards conciliation and mediation as a 
primary objective, with adjudication being secondary.51 
Bearing this background in mind, it is not surprising that Chinese arbitrators 
engage in settling disputes. This author investigated Chinese methodology in a 
series of interviews with Chinese arbitrators acting mainly for CIETAC, as well as 
for the Beijing Arbitration Commission and Wuhan Arbitration Commission.52 
According to the arbitrators interviewed, Chinese arbitrators systematically ask 
the parties at the beginning of the hearing whether they wish the tribunal to assist 
them in reaching an amicable solution. Although the exact percentage varies 
depending on the interviewee, one can estimate that the response is affirmative 
in about 50 per cent of the cases. Chinese arbitrators tend to engage in private 
45
 This survey gives only a partial view. Indeed, for practical reasons, it was not possible to include settlements 
brought about with the assistance of the arbitrators that were not incorporated in a consent award and 
merely resulted in the withdrawal of a claim. Moreover, more comprehensive forensic research would have 
to review awards issued under the auspices of other institutions as well. 
46
 For German and Swiss law, see discussion and citations supra; for the pertinent Latin American legal systems, 
see Brazilian Code of Civil Procedure, art. 125(iv) and Argentine Code of Civil Procedure, arts. 309, 843 and 
849. 
47
 See Simon Roberts and Michael Palmer, Dispute Processes (2nd edn, 2005), pp. 11-12. 
48
 Ibid. 
49
 The Chinese conception of social harmony is based on the concept of Li, which includes rituals that seek to 
'facilitate communication and ... foster a sense of community'. Roger Ames and Henry Rosemont, The 
Analects of Confucius: a Philosophical Translation (1998), p. 51. O n an axiological scale, Li is above the concept of 
Fa, which relates to a compulsive and punitive imposition of order. See Scott Donahey, 'Seeking Harmony: Is 
the Asian Concept of the Conciliator/Arbitrator Applicable in the West?' in (1995) DRJ (April) 74 at pp. 7 4 -
75; Btlhring-Uhle, supra n. 1 at p. 276. 
50
 In China, the art of compromise is called Jang. See Jerome A. Cohen, Neil Kaplan and Peter Malanczuk, 
Arbitration in China: a Practical Guide (2004), pp. 1-50. See also, Johannes Trappe, 'Conciliation in the Far East' 
in (1989) 5 Arb. Int'l 173; Donahey, supra n. 49; James T Peter, 'Med-Arb in International Arbitration' in 
(1997) 8 Am. Rev. Int'l Arb. 83 at p. 107. 
51
 See generally, Roberts and Palmer, supra n. 47 at pp. 11-12; Sybille van der Sprenkel, Legal Institutions in Manchu 
China (1962), pp. 135-136. See also, Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler and Kun Fan, 'Integrating Mediation into 
Arbitration: Why it Works in China?' in (2008) 25 J Int'l Arb. 479; Kun Fan, Arbitration in China: Practice, 
Legal Obstacles and Reforms' in (2008) vol. 19/no. 2 ICC Bulletin. 
52
 For a detailed discussion of the Chinese practice of combining mediation with arbitration, see Kaufmann-
Kohler and Fan, supra n. 51. 
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meetings with the parties and in shuttle diplomacy. They do not hesitate to meet 
separately with each party. However, Chinese arbitrators appear to refrain from 
giving assessments of the merits of the case, because they consider that expressing 
an opinion on the outcome would be improper and would put their impartiality 
in jeopardy53 
III. P R O S A N D C O N S O F A R B I T R A T O R S F A C I L I T A T I N G 
S E T T L E M E N T 
This section examines what considerations determine the law and practice just set 
out. What is the underlying rationale? What are the advantages and drawbacks of 
the judge or arbitrator promoting settlement? The pros and cons are important 
because they ideally should shape the type of activity in which the arbitrator may 
engage in support of settlement, an issue to which we will return. 
The main advantage obviously lies in the increased efficiency of the dispute 
resolution process. It encompasses all the benefits that usually are attributed to 
setded, rather than decided, outcomes. These benefits arise from any amicable 
settlement, be it reached in direct negotiation, by way of separate mediation, or 
with the assistance of an arbitrator. Is there an added value in having settlement 
facilitated by the arbitral tribunal in charge of deciding the dispute? The answer 
is 'ye s ' j f ° r a t least three reasons. First, the arbitrator already knows the case. 
A third party mediator or conciliator who acts before or in parallel to the 
arbitration must acquire such knowledge, with the unavoidable duplication of 
work, additional expenses and delays. Second and foremost, the arbitrator is the 
master of the timing of the proceedings, and is in the best position to choose the 
appropriate moment to offer the tribunal's services for settlement purposes. This 
may often be after the exchange of written briefs and before the hearing. It may 
also be after a partial award. It should not be too early in the proceedings, when 
the arbitrators (and sometimes the parties as well) do not have a sufficient 
understanding of the issues. It should not be too late either; it should not be at a 
time when the parties have already spent too much on the arbitration and may no 
longer be willing to settle. Identifying the right moment is a question of judgment, 
and experienced arbitrators will generally know when the time is ripe. Finally, 
a settlement agreement entered into in the course of a pending arbitration 
may form part of a consent award and become enforceable under the New York 
Convention. 
What are the disadvantages of arbitrator-facilitated settlement? There are 
several. The main one is the threat to impartiality. The fear is that, in the event 
that the settlement fails and the arbitration continues, the arbitrator will lose his 
53
 Interestingly enough, the practice of Swiss and German arbitrators is different. They do not caucus, out of 
a sense that this may breach due process, but readily provide evaluations or assessments of the possible 
outcome. 
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or her objectivity on account of the information he or she became privy to during 
the conciliation proceedings that is not part of the record. This threat appears to 
be more perceived than real. Indeed, only one case was identified that removed 
arbitrators or set aside or refused to enforce an award on the ground that an 
arbitrator became involved in settlement,54 while there are many court cases that 
hold exactly the opposite — that the involvement of a judge in the settlement of his 
or her own cases is admissible.55 The same ought to apply to an arbitrator. 
The case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on the right 
to a fair trial under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights is 
also helpful. Although not exactly on point, one decision is enlightening by 
analogy. An arbitrator had disclosed a conflict of interest, and the parties had 
accepted that he act nevertheless. One of them later challenged the award on the 
ground that the arbitrator actually did turn out to be biased as a result of his 
conflict of interest. The award was confirmed in the national courts, and the 
ECtHR refused to set aside this result. It held that the party had given its 
unequivocal consent to waive the requirement of impartiality. That unequivocal 
waiver had to be enforced, as it was 'accompanied by sufficient guarantees 
commensurate to its importance', given the representation of the parties by legal 
counsel.56 This is the latest in a series of decisions coming from the ECtHR 
(in particular, the former Commission) that consider that procedural rights in 
voluntary arbitration can be waived insofar as minimum guarantees are respected.57 
For our purposes, it can be drawn from these cases (and the absence of others) 
that an arbitrator may engage in settlement discussions without incurring the risk 
of being challenged, provided he or she obtains the informed consent of the 
parties beforehand. 
Another drawback to the arbitrator facilitating settlement is the risk of a 
breach of due process if he or she meets privately with a party. On this occasion, 
a party may reveal facts to the tribunal that are unknown to the other party. As a 
consequence, the other party may be deprived of its due process right to rebut 
those facts. There are three possible remedies to avoid such a breach. The first 
one is that the arbitrator may not use such facts if the arbitration continues. This 
54
 See Spier v. Cakaturiftcio Tecnica SpA, 71 F. Supp.2d 279, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (refusing to enforce an award 
which had been set aside at the place of arbitration (Italy) on the grounds that the arbitrators had 
overstepped the powers attributed to them in the arbitration agreement, by getting the parties to settle 
certain issues, even though the parties had given them certain settlement powers). See also, in an English 
adjudication matter, Glencot Development and Design Co. Ltd v. Ben Barrett & Son (Contractors) Ltd (13 February 
2001), discussed in Peter Talbot, 'Should an Arbitrator or Adjudicator Act as a Mediator in the Same 
Dispute?' in (2001) 67(1) Journal of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators 221. 
55
 See e.g., in the United States: Wiley v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 11 Fed. Appx. 181, 182 (4th Cir. 2001); In re 
Martinez-Catala, 129 F.3d 213, 216-218 (1st Cir. 1997); Johnson v. Shaker Heights City School District, 2007 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 17963 (N.D Ohio 2007), at *5-10; Bell v. Johnson, 404 F.3d 997, 1005 (6th Cir. 2005); Swiss 
Supreme Court decision reported in ATF 131 I 113. 
56
 Suovaniemi v. Finland, Application No. 31737/96, ECtHR. 
57
 See also, X v. Federal Republic of Germany, Commission Decision of 5 March 1962, Application No. 1197/61, 
(1962) 5 TB 88; Nordstrbm-Janzon and Nordstrom-Lehtinen v. The Netherlands, Commission Decision of 27 
November 1996, Application No. 28101/95, DR 51, p. 112. 
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is the Chinese solution.58 However, this solution does not eliminate the risk that 
the arbitrator may nevertheless be influenced by what he or she has heard. The 
second alternative is that the arbitrator discloses such facts to the other party if 
the arbitration proceeds. This is the Hong Kong solution.59 This alternative may 
deter the parties from being open in the separate sessions and, thus, defeat the 
very purpose of such sessions. The third possibility is to refrain from private 
sessions altogether. Regrettably, this solution does away with what is often 
considered one of the most efficient mediation tools.60 At the same time, it is 
undoubtedly the safest remedy. This solution will not only avoid the risk of a 
breach of due process, but will also help avoid an impairment of the confidence of 
the parties in the arbitrator. The IBA Rules of Ethics for International Arbitrators 
support this view, providing that the arbitral tribunal may make settlement 
proposals 'to both parties simultaneously, and preferably in the presence of each 
other'. The IBA Rules then point out that it is 'undesirable that any arbitrator 
discuss settlement terms with a party in the absence of the other', since this may 
result in the arbitrator's disqualification.61 
These provisions in the IBA Rules influence the types of settlement activities an 
arbitrator can carry out. Such activities will differ from those of a mediator. The 
arbitrator will not be able to engage in full-fledged facilitative, interest-based 
mediation. His or her intervention is likely to be more evaluative and rights-
based. Concretely, any settlement attempt by an arbitrator will not last as long as 
a true mediation - presumably one session of a few hours. Often parties will not 
settle then, but the attempt will trigger further direct negotiations, in many instances 
resulting in a settlement. 
In any event, some mediators favour mediation with counsel only or with 
the parties only without counsel,62 while others favour mediation without any 
58
 CIETAC Arbitration Rules 2005, art. 40(8), provides that, 'where conciliation fails, any opinion, view or 
statement and any proposal or proposition expressing acceptance or opposition by either party or by the 
arbitral tribunal in the process of conciliation shall not be invoked as grounds for any claim, defense or 
counterclaim in the subsequent arbitration proceedings, judicial proceedings or any other proceedings'. BAC 
Arbitration Rules 2004, art. 38(4), has similar provisions. 
59
 Hong Kong Ordinance Act (2000), s. 2B(3), provides that, 'where confidential information is obtained by an 
arbitrator or umpire from a party to the reference during conciliation proceedings and those proceedings 
terminate without the parties reaching agreement in settlement of their dispute, the arbitrator or umpire 
shall, before resuming the arbitration proceedings, disclose to all other parties to the reference as much of 
that information as he considers is material to the arbitration proceedings'. 
60
 On the advantages of separate meetings (e.g., clarifications of the position, release of anger, assessment of 
acceptability of settlement options and reality testing), see e.g., Buhring Uhle, supra n. 1 at pp. 206—208. 
61
 IBA Rules of Ethics for International Arbitrators (1987), s. 8. The rule specifies that the tribunal (or the 
presiding arbitrator alone) may make proposals for setdement upon the parties' request or on his or her own 
suggestion to which the parties have consented. With respect to caucusing, it further specifies that 'any 
procedure is possible with the agreement of the parties'. 
62
 See William D. Coleman, 'The Mediation Alternative: Participating in a Problem-Solving Process' in (1995) 
56 Ala. L 100 at p. 106. See also, Flavia Fragale Martins Pepino, 'Mediation and Reluctant Lawyers: 
Suggestions for Mediators' Approaches' in (2006) 5 Appalachian JL 241 at p. 246 (noting that the former 
option should be chosen only in extreme situations); Craig A. McEwen and Richard J. Maiman, 'Mediation 
in Small Claims Court: Achieving Compliance through Consent' in (1984) 18 Law and Soc'y Rev. 11 at p. 21 
(asserting that the latter option increases the likelihood of compliance by the parties). But see Elizabeth Ellen 
Gordon, Attorneys' Negotiation Strategies in Mediation: Business as Usual?' in (2000) Mediation Q,(Summer) 
383 (asserting that the former has been observed in actual mediations, but never the latter). 
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caucusing at all because private meetings 'may interfere with the opportunity 
for the parties to work with each other to resolve their own problems'.63 The 
usefulness of this latter option of mediation without caucusing is particularly high 
when there is considerable distrust between the parties.64 It also means that if the 
parties want full-fledged mediation resorting to all available mediation techniques, 
which normally takes place over several sessions, they should resort to the services 
of a separate mediator and not to those of an arbitral tribunal. 
There are still a few other drawbacks. One is the risk that the parties may feel 
coerced into settlement. In addition to any possible pressure to settle that the 
tribunal might (unduly) exert, the very fact that the conciliation is conducted by 
the person who will adjudicate the dispute in the event of failure of the settlement 
may put pressure on the parties. One could call it conciliation 'in the shadow of a 
possible future award'.65 This risk is mitigated if the arbitrator merely offers his or 
her preliminary views on the basis of the record as it then stands, making it clear 
that he or she has not heard the evidence yet and could still change his or her mind 
in the course of the proceedings. Beyond that, nothing can be done to completely 
eliminate this risk, which can also be a healthy incentive to reasonableness. 
A further drawback is the concern that the parties may not candidly express 
their positions in a conciliation conducted by someone who may later rule on the 
dispute. This is certainly a legitimate concern. While such a concern does not outright 
condemn any attempt by the arbitrator to conciliate, it implies that such an 
attempt will not rely on a search for the underlying interests but, rather, will tend to 
be evaluative. This observation is in line with the consequences of earlier limitations 
on the arbitrator's settlement activities, especially in the absence of caucusing. 
Finally, in the context of the considerations that go against an arbitrator's 
conciliation efforts, one must remember that certain categories of disputes may 
not lend themselves to settlement. Doping disputes in sports are one such category 
because of the public interest involved and the overriding principle of equal 
treatment of the athletes. 
Similarly, one must ask whether investment treaty disputes are another such 
category because of the strong public interests involved.66 Two aspects are 
63
 See Abramson, supra n. 1 at p. 11. See also, Dwight Golann, Mediating Legal Disputes: Effective Strategies for Lawyers 
and Mediators (1996), s. 3.2; Leonard L. Riskin, 'Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strategies, and 
Techniques: a Grid for the Perplexed' in (1996) 1 Harv. JVegot. L Rev. 7 at p. 51 (discussing all of these options 
when designing a mediation). But see Joseph B. Stulberg and B. Ruth Montgomery, 'Design Requirements for 
Mediator Development Programs' in (1987) 15 Hofstra L Rev. 499 at p. 531 n. 109 (noting how some labour 
mediators say that people who help resolve labour disputes without caucusing 'are not really "mediating" '). 
64
 See Drew Peterson, 'Getting Together: Appropriate Dispute Resolution Alternatives' in (2002) 26 AKBar Rag. 
(November-December) 8 (noting how this is the case in many family disputes). 
65
 This expression derives, of course, from the phrase 'bargaining in the shadow of the law', coined by 
Mnookin and Kornhauser. See Robert H. Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser, 'Bargaining in the Shadow of the 
Law' in (1979) 88 Tate LJ 950. 
66
 One might also ask whether the fact that investment law is still unsettled on many issues and that every 
settlement is a lost opportunity to state the law are reasons to discourage settlement attempts. For a 
discussion of how settlement frustrates the development of key legal principles in another area, see e.g., Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow, 'For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement Conference' 
in (1985) 33 UCLA L Rev. 485 at pp. 500-502. 
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particularly striking when looking at the settlement practice in investment 
disputes. First, many disputes are settled by direct negotiations. Secondly, 
arbitrators do not engage in settiement facilitation. An analysis of ICSID cases 
shows that out of a total of 152 concluded cases (including six conciliation and 14 
additional facility cases),67 32 proceedings were terminated pursuant to ICSID 
Arbitration Rules, art. 43(1), which provides that the parties can settle the dispute 
and request the discontinuance of the arbitration. It further shows that 10 were 
consent awards embodying the parties' agreed settlement under art. 43(2) of the 
ICSID Arbitration Rules, and one was an additional facility award (pursuant to 
Arbitration Rule 49(1) of the Additional Facility Rules).68 In addition, 11 cases 
were discontinued upon the request of one party following a settlement in 
accordance with Arbitration Rule 44. Finally, three of the five conciliation cases 
ended with settlements. As a result, out of 152 concluded cases, 60 were resolved 
by way of a settlement; 15 of these cases were settled prior to the constitution of 
the tribunal or settlement commission, and four were settled after the issuance of 
an award on the merits, in particular in the context of a revision,69 annulment70 
or resubmission after an annulment.71 In short, a significant portion of investment 
disputes submitted to arbitration is resolved by amicable settlement, not to speak 
of the disputes that are settled before an arbitration is initiated. 
By contrast, and although this might not be entirely reflective of the settlement 
activities deployed by investment arbitrators, research yields only one case in 
which an ICSID tribunal actively facilitated settlement. In an unreported 
contract arbitration, the tribunal offered its assistance to the parties, who had 
stated at the first session that they were willing to settle but unable to agree on the 
terms.72 The president then acted as mediator during a few months, upon which 
the parties reached a partial settlement. In brief, a successful but very rare 
endeavour. 
How can these two conflicting aspects be explained? It is true that investment 
arbitration is often the last resort once negotiations at all levels of government 
have failed and the 'cooling off period' has elapsed.73 It is also true that a state 
67
 The ICSID website was last consulted on 29 October 2008 (http://icsid.worldbank.org). 
68
 See e.g., for a published example, Antoine Goetz and others v. Republic of Burundi (Case No. ARB/95/3), Award 
embodying the parties' settlement agreement of 10 February 1999, (French original in (2000) 15 ICSID Rev. 
- FILJ 457; English translation in (2004) 6 ICSID Rep. 5; (2001) 26 TB Com. Arb. 24 (excerpts)). This would 
be primarily asked for enforcement purposes, since the ICSID award so rendered will benefit from the 
Convention's provisions on recognition and enforcement, under which an award enjoys the same status as a 
final judgment of a court in the Contracting State in which the recognition or enforcement is sought. 
69
 See American Manufacturing & Trading, Inc. v. Democratic Republic of the Congo (Case No. ARB/93/1). 
70
 See Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd v. Arab Republic of Egypt (Case No. ARB/84/3); Joy Mining 
Machinery Ltd v. Arab Republic of Egypt (Case No. ARB/03/11). 
71
 See Maritime International Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea (Case No. ARB/84/4). 
72
 See Eloi'se Obadia, 'How Proactive Arbitrators Really are in Conducting Arbitral Proceedings: an ICSID 
Perspective' in (1999) 16(2) News from ICSID (Fall), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ 
FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDNewsLettersRH&actionVal=ViewNewsLetters 
73
 See Barton Legum, 'The Difficulty of Conciliation in Investment Treaty Cases: a Comment on Professor Jack 
C. Coe's "Toward a Complementary Use of Conciliation in Investor-State Disputes, a Preliminary Sketch"' 
in (2007) 4(1) TDM (February). 
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seeking to settle an investment dispute faces political constraints that may lead to 
a 'disinclination to take responsibility for settlement when that burden can be 
assigned to an adjudicator'.74 Indeed, while the board or management of a 
corporation makes a business decision to settle (subject, of course, to its 
accountability to shareholders), a state is likely to have to engage in a complex 
political, social and budgetary process. It is further true that a state may wish to 
avoid setting a precedent vis-a-vis other investors by voluntarily admitting its 
responsibility. Even if these considerations may well make the settlement of 
investment disputes more difficult than that of commercial disputes, the figures set 
out above demonstrate that they are no obstacle to settlements reached in direct 
negotiations. Hence, these considerations cannot explain why no settlement 
facilitation takes place in investment arbitration. 
There must be other reasons. One reason may be that conciliation and 
mediation are not popular avenues in investment arbitration so far.75 These 
methods of dispute settlement are not institutionalised as they are in commercial 
arbitration. Another reason may lie in the concerns about the risk of 
disqualification of arbitrators who have taken part in failed settlement initiatives. 
The risk is no different in nature from that found in the context of commercial 
arbitration, which was discussed above. However, it may be perceived as more 
acute. Still another reason may be the often more formal setting of investment 
arbitrations as opposed to commercial arbitrations, that does not lend itself to 
informal settlement initiatives, and possibly the legal background of counsel 
acting in many of these proceedings. However, none of these possible reasons 
present a bar to settlement facilitation as a matter of principle. In particular, the 
demands of equal treatment found in sports arbitration do not apply here, at least 
not to the same extent.76 
In conclusion, one finds no convincing justification to consider that investment 
disputes as a category must be excluded from settlement facilitation. Because of their 
specificity, however, increased attention must be devoted to procedural safeguards. 
fejack C. Goe Jr., 'Toward a Complementary Use of Conciliation in Investor-State Disputes, a Preliminary 
Sketch' in (2007) 4(1) TDM (February) 29. See also, ibid. pp. 27-28 ('Settlements divert attention from the 
legal merits of the underlying controversy and may thereby shroud dubious levels of treaty compliance in 
ambiguity, producing less incentive for the states to institute corrective measures. Though arbitral tribunals 
typically have no power to order an end to an offending measure, states self-regulate in light of the 
pronouncements of tribunals and any liability that might flow therefrom. Reasoned adjudications thus 
provide law-makers guidance and stimulation not found in mediated agreements, the very point of which 
might have been to avoid such corrective influences. It is therefore reasonable to question whether states 
might not find conciliation to be too comfortable a blind, where bad habits might be perpetuated') (footnotes 
omitted). 
ICSID also offers Conciliation Rules that have only been used five times since 1982. On how conciliation 
might come to complement investment arbitration more systematically and routinely, see Coe, Jr., supra n. 74, 
and see Noah Rubins, 'Comments to Jack C. Coejr.'s Article on Conciliation' in (2007) 4(1) TDM (February), 
for a review of the usual elements put forward to explain the rare use of conciliation in investor-state 
disputes. 
See for the same difference between sports and investment arbitration observed in another context, Gabrielle 
Kaufmann-Kohler, 'Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity or Excuse? The 2006 Freshfields Lecture' in 
(2007) 23 Arb, Int'l 276. 
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IV T O W A R D S A T R A N S N A T I O N A L S T A N D A R D 
Having determined where we stand by setting out the current law and practice, 
and the advantages and drawbacks, the next step is to examine where we are 
going from here and whether we are moving towards a transnational rule. There 
is no reason why the continuing process of harmonisation of international 
arbitration law should be stopped by the present issue. It is very likely that a 
transnational practice will develop over time on this topic, as it has for many 
other topics in the past. 
To evaluate a legal evolution, it is often helpful to step back and look to the 
teachings of legal theorists and anthropologists on such matters. On the basis of 
the history of dispute settlement in all regions of the world, legal anthropologists 
observe a constant alternation between formal and informal dispute resolution 
methods.77 At the beginning, a method of dispute resolution is always informal. 
The human search for predictability then generates more and more rules relating 
to that method of dispute resolution.78 In the end, there are too many rules and 
the mechanism becomes too slow and cumbersome. It no longer meets the needs 
of its users, so the users turn to other methods of dispute resolution that are less 
formal,79 and the cycle starts anew.80 
This is what happened to court systems in general.81 It explains the evolution 
of the role of the judge and the increased use of ADR, whether performed by the 
judge, by court-annexed mechanisms or otherwise. Among the ADR methods 
used in reaction to excessive formalism of the courts, one may count arbitration, 
which was favoured for its flexibility or lack of formalism. However, arbitration 
has gradually evolved towards incorporating more rules, thus becoming 
A good overview is provided by Roberts and Palmer, supra n. 47 at pp. 1—77, with many references. 
See Serge Guinchard, 'L'evitement du juge civil' in Jean Clam and Gilles Martin (eds.), Les transformations de 
la regulation juridique (1998), p. 221 at p. 226. 
See Susan Silbey and Austin Sarat, 'Dispute Processing in Law and Legal Scholarship: From Institutional 
Critique to the Reconstruction of the Juridical Subject' in (1989) 66 Daw. UL Rev. 437 at pp. 472-496; 
Francois Ost, Jupiter, Hercule, Hermes: trois modeles du juge' in Pierre Bouretz (ed.), Laforce du droit (1991), 
p. 241 at pp. 245-249 and 257-260. 
See Jerold S. Auerbach, Justice Without Law? (1983), pp. 14—15 (speaking of 'a recurrent dialectic between 
legality and its alternatives'); Thomas Schultz, 'Human Rights: a Speed Bump for Arbitral Procedures?' in 
(2006) 9 International Arbitration L Rev. 8 at pp. 8-9 (speaking of the 'conveyor belt' of new informal procedures 
becoming gradually more formalised); Jean-Pierre Bonafe-Schmitt, 'La mediation: du droit impose au droit 
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proceduralised and judicialised.82 As a result, arbitration is now often seen as 
being slow and expensive. This is when the search for more informal mechanisms 
begins again. Thus, it is likely that, as in the context of courts, users will seek new, 
more informal ways of resolving disputes. Resorting to separate mediation 
proceedings may be one option. The arbitrator acting as conciliator may be 
another. At the same time, it is equally likely that the users will need some 
predictability about these methods of dispute resolution, and, hence, related rules 
will emerge. 
Rules are indeed emerging. We have uncovered bits and pieces of rules, pieces 
of the puzzle, throughout this lecture. If we now seek to assemble those pieces, 
what does the puzzle look like? In other words, what would the content of the 
rule on arbitrator-facilitated settlement be? 
A viable rule must take account of the pros and cons addressed above and 
accommodate the sensitivities expressed in the different laws and practices. It 
must necessarily merge different traditions or else it will not gain wide 
acceptance. On this basis, and building up on the preceding analysis, one could 
articulate a rule with the following content: 
• The arbitrator may facilitate settlement, provided that a number of 
safeguards are put into place. He or she may offer to facilitate settlement 
at any time during the proceedings on his or her own initiative or at the 
parties' request. 
• The arbitrator may not begin to facilitate settlement unless he or she 
obtains the informed consent of the parties. Such informed consent will 
imply a waiver of the challenge of the arbitrator or of the award if the 
settlement fails. The requirement for consent is in conformity with the 
consensual nature of arbitration and the parties' procedural autonomy. The 
consent must be given to the principle of the arbitrator acting as settlement 
facilitator and to the procedure to be followed. 
• As a rule, the arbitrator will not meet separately with the parties, and his or 
her involvement will be evaluative rather than facilitative. The process 
should also be kept simple and short. 
• The arbitrator should respect the parties' freedom of decision and not force 
settlement. 
• There may exist categories of disputes involving a strong public interest 
that do not lend themselves to settlement by an arbitrator. One of these 
categories may be doping and possibly other disciplinary matters in sports 
disputes, because conciliation would not be compatible with the general 
principle of equal treatment of athletes. 
• If an arbitrator considers himself or herself as lacking objectivity as a result 
of the (failed) conciliation attempt, he or she should resign. This element of 
This is one of the main themes of Oppetit, supra n. 38, e.g. at pp. 27-34. See also, Pierre Lalive, Arbitration: 
the Civilized Solution?' in (1998) 16 ASA Bull. 483; Jean-Baptiste Racine, 'Les derives procedurales de 
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the rule is inspired by the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest. If such 
bias were to materialise in practice, the result would be counter-productive 
in terms of the efficiency of the dispute resolution process, which was the 
very reason for allowing the arbitrator to enter into a settlement attempt in 
the first place. Indeed, the replacement of an arbitrator necessarily entails 
delays and possibly extra costs. It is, therefore, hoped that such resignations 
will not occur in practice, the more so as the existence of this rule will 
encourage arbitrators to act cautiously. 
Consequently, if the parties wish a different settlement process that goes beyond 
these safeguards, then they should resort to separate mediation or other ADR 
mechanisms and not involve an arbitral tribunal. 
With these safeguards or limitations on the arbitrator's activities concerning 
settlement, it is submitted that settlement facilitation by the arbitral tribunal can 
be a helpful tool to improve the efficiency of arbitration. Because these proposed 
rules balance the pros and cons, because they merge the different traditions and 
practices, and because they are in line with the general evolution of dispute 
settlement, it is further submitted that the standards just set forth could gain 
increased acceptance with time and evolve into a transnational rule. 
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